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Abstract: The Porongos defeat over the secessionist rebels on November 14, 1844, 
militarily and politically solidified the barão de Caxias’ coming victory, which 
would end the longest rebellion in Brazilian history, the farroupilha, 1835-1845.  
Most of the encounters to come were small, mopping-up and surveillance actions, 
except for one, at Arroio Grande, just two weeks after Porongos. Suspiciously, the 
targets of both these assaults were the libertos, slaves the rebels had seized from 
their provincial loyalist neighbors, and whom they armed and ostensibly freed. 
Before Porongos, Caxias and the farrapo general Canabarro had arrived at the 
same conclusion: in order to have peace, conciliation, and a return to Imperial 
order, the rebels needed proof that their cause was lost. The best and most 
convenient solution led Caxias and Canabarro to use Black losses to show the war 
was no longer winnable, and to defang them as a future menace. When Canabarro 
assembled what was the last great rebel army on the Cerro do Porongos, liberto 
soldiers comprised its very core.  On that November morning, approximately 35% 
of Canabarro’s troops were either killed, wounded, or captured. Nearly all those 
who died or were taken prisoner came from the ranks of the liberto infantry. If the 
many mysteries swirling around Porongos were stripped away, what would emerge 
and converge at Porongos were two historical shadows still coursing through the 
borderlands, hatianismo and artiguismo. These were neither doctrines nor unique 
to the borderlands, yet together they advised both rebel and Imperial policy, and 
were implicit in the immediacies of decision-making which determined the libertos’ 
fate.  
 
 Independent Scholar, Rockville Centre, NY. PhD, University of Texas, 1972. Email: 
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Resumo: A derrota em Porongos dos rebeldes secessionistas em 14 de novembro 
de 1844, militarmente e politicamente solidificou a vitória do barão de Caxias, que 
acabaria com a mais longa rebelião da história brasileira, a Farroupilha, 1835-1845. 
A maioria dos embates seguintes  foi de ações de vigilância, com exceção de um, em 
Arroio Grande, apenas duas semanas depois de Porongos. Desconfiados, os alvos 
desses dois assaltos eram os libertos, escravos que os rebeldes haviam apreendido 
de seus vizinhos legalistas , e que eles armaram e ostensivamente libertaram. Antes 
de Porongos, Caxias e o general farrapo Canabarro chegaram à mesma conclusão: 
para ter paz, conciliação e um retorno à ordem imperial, os rebeldes precisavam de 
provas de que sua causa estava perdida. A melhor e mais conveniente solução levou 
Caxias e Canabarro a usar o esmagamento dos libertos  para mostrar que a guerra 
estava vencida e desabilitá-los como uma ameaça futura. Quando Canabarro 
montou o que foi o último grande exército rebelde no Cerro de Porongos, os 
soldados libertos consistiram seu núcleo. Naquela manhã de novembro, 
aproximadamente 35% das tropas de Canabarro foram mortas, feridas ou 
capturadas. Quase todos aqueles que morreram ou foram feitos prisioneiros vieram 
das fileiras da infantaria liberta. Se os muitos mistérios que giravam em torno de 
Porongos fossem desconstruídos, o que emergiria e convergiria em Porongos 
seriam duas sombras históricas que ainda atravessavam fronteiras, hatianismo e 
artiguismo. Não eram nem doutrinas, nem exclusivas das terras fronteiriças, mas 
juntas aconselharam tanto a política rebelde quanto a imperial, e estavam 
implícitas no contexto da tomada de decisões que determinavam o destino dos 
libertos.  




In the preparation of this paper I have approached the story of “the fighting 
libertos” within an interpretive framework, relying upon the revisionist school of 
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thought associated with the North American Brazilianists of the 1970s and those 
historians of slavery who later   returned dignity and agency to the slave. I was 
trained and influenced by two Brazilianists, Warren Dean and Anthony Leeds, who 
were not only concerned with economic and military elites, but with broader 
ecological determinents. In revisiting Porongos, i have gathered new insights from 
current scholarship on slavery in the Americas, in particular Alan Taylor and Julius 
Scott. The explosion of innovative works on the southern borderlands from (Gunter 
Axt, Miqueias Mugge, Daniela Carvalho, Adriana Souza, Cesar Guazzelli, and 
others), some of whom use quantitative history in their empirical research into 
what was before unexplored archival resources, have added not only depth, but also 
texture, when it relates to slave lives and conditions. Yet, one should never lose 
sight of the masterly political works of Alfredo Varela.  
 
Part I: Borderlands on Fire: the role of the libertos 
The farroupilha, 1835-1845, was a far more serious challenge to the 
Empire’s integrity than any of the other revolts during the Regency period for its 
geographic scale, the vigor of its cavalry, and the rebels’ highly personal 
relationships with unstable neighbors hostile to past Brazilian advances.1 However 
depleted or seemingly intractable, and despite their loss of critical ground, 
farrapos exhibited a remarkable staying power, devised from their militia past, 
exposing Caxias to men whose professed beliefs were alarmingly close to those of 
 
1 The intentional weaponizing of slaves by those in the white power structure was not unknown in 
Brazil. Latafundias from colonial days on down armed slaves to protect and enlarge their properties; 
and the use of henriques, Black troops under government auspices, helped expel or diminish foreign 
invaders. In the later Luso-Brazilian Cisplatine adventures against the newly independent Spanish-
Americans, Rio approved the army’s incorporation of henriques into segregated black battalions. 
But the private and occasional arming by the state was vastly different from slaves involved in 
rebellious enterprises, exposing the white establishment to more threatening outcomes. In the first 
half of the 19th century, in episodes of rebellion against Rio, opposition forces, though in limited 
and restricted ways, brought and accepted slaves into their ranks: Pernambuco, 1817, and in Bahia’s 
sabinada, 1837-38 (See KRAAY,2006 for  a concise discussion). In other rebellions during the 
tumultuous Regency Period, slaves often initiated revolt, forming themselves into armed groups 
with others from the dispossessed,  as in Para’s cabanagem, 1834-40. Led by white estanceiro 
elites, the farroupilha drew strength from its borderland position, taking advantage when it could 
from its republican  neighbors and from its own fierce and  highly mobile Black forces, shaking 
loose the frontier. 
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the new republican states in the La Plata. Just as worrisome, the farrapos had 
followed in their footsteps, adding slaves into their armies. Back in late 1836, while 
establishing their own republican government, the rebels had created permanent 
liberto fighting units, mostly out of slaves seized from riograndense loyalists, 
which caused unease for Caxias as they had his many unsuccessful predecessors 
(BENTO, 1993, II, p.53-54). A quick study in plains warfare, though, Caxias was 
able to turn Imperial fortunes around upon his dual appointment as governor and 
commander over the rebellious province in 1842 (MENDES, 2015). Under his 
management, the war was becoming one-sided; yet, he was progressively more 
troubled by liberto importance the more Canabarro relied upon them.   
No one knew how far the farrapos would go beyond the known liberto 
brigade, nor if these former slaves would shed their collective subservience, making 
themselves even more dangerous. Their very existence represented an ongoing 
threat to white dominance, governance, and Brazil’s Platine ambitions (ARARIPE, 
1986, p. 87).  Though these libertos comprised less than a thousand men and 
seemed inconsequential in comparison to the Haitian experience, in the context of 
the two over-lapping civil contests on Brazil’s border, the farroupilha and the 
guerra grande, 1836-52, they bred concerns in Rio, and helped trigger Caxias’ 
decisions (LEITMAN, 1977, p. 507; GUAZZELLI, 2005, p. 21). As the war was 
winding down, these mobile libertos, with their own cadre of lower level officers, 
had suffered innumerable affronts as second class farrapos, and were increasingly 
being seen as internal enemies with unsettling knowledge and experience in 
borderland politics and warfare. Few military men on either side of the conflict 
extolled them. Had Imperial and rebel leadership been bravely candid, they would 
have admitted the truth instead of burying the libertos’ prowess and importance on 
the Cerro.  If the libertos were to be truly freed following the farroupilha, or if they 
collectively broke away from the rebel army, the possibilities of their catalyzing 
unknown change were too great to leave unresolved (SCOTT, 2018; TAYLOR, 
2013).  
As a military man who had fought both with and against slaves, Caxias 
appreciated the real and potential influence of the farrapo libertos, who had 
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become an explicit focal point of Rio’s planning, at least since the early 1840s 
(LEITMAN, 1977, 2018). But to Caxias, the libertos were still, and would always be, 
slaves. He upheld Brazil’s architecture of slavery, coldly calculating libertos as a 
numerically important component of his opponent’s armies. This special class of 
rebels was, in 1844, literally and physically positioned at the very crossroads of 
highly volatile states, which had advanced attitudes and laws on slavery, and 
histories of actively enlisting slaves. The rupture between riograndense-Oriental 
relationships over the latter’s abolitionist tendencies and laws had collided in 1842 
when Uruguay officially ended slavery, helping to ease regional and national 
interests between the farrapos and the Empire. Ending secession without 
removing the libertos was impossible.  
Accordingly, Caxias gave them due priority, subtle enough, by eliminating 
them as prizes for caudillos across the border, which prevented them from 
impeding peace between the rebels and the Empire. Caxias recognized the farrapo 
reliance on slavery, which would more easily allow them to release their obligations 
to the libertos in exchange for reconciliation and rewards. A revered national hero 
of unassailable credibility, Caxias has escaped culpability, but his practice of 
handing out monetary favors to quiet rebellious fervor certainly made it easier for 
David Canabarro and others to accede to this morally perilous approach sanctioned 
by men of power to conceal their behavior (SOUZA, 2008, SILVA, 2010). Without 
the libertos, farroupilha successes would have been much fewer; but, without the 
institution of slavery, Rio Grande do Sul would have a much diminished future. 
Within this ordered world, the libertos no longer belonged fully to the farrapos, 
but were enemy-seized property, temporarily master-less. For his part, Canabarro 
used them as a potent bargaining chip, his last critical asset to deploy maximum 
pressure to push Caxias into a favorable peace. Canabarro enticed the Uruguayan 
caudillo Fructuoso Rivera, whose artiguista linkages to revolution and slave 
soldiers showed no signs of receding, with Black units in exchange for fresh horses, 
which had been done before when they offered Rivera the libertos as loaned 
mercenaries. Rivera’s prior temporary acquisitions of farrapo libertos were well 
known to Caxias and within ministerial circles. Everyone knew that, Rivera being 
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Rivera, his appetite had not changed. The urgency and uncertainty of politics and 
war in the borderlands propelled Caxias and Canabarro towards each other. No 
matter which of them or their close confidants had first generated the Porongos 
scheme to massacre the libertos, an agreement was reached and carried out.  
One could argue, then, that in the farroupilha, the farrapos were protecting 
themselves from the residue of artiguismo and haitianismo by rebelling to ensure 
slavery on their terms in the borderlands against Uruguayan pretensions, and to fill 
the vacuum of recent Imperial retreat from the Cisplatine. The farroupilha had 
several other root cause, but safeguarding property in a world of great change and 
forces beyond their immediate control was a manifestation of their extreme 
localism, the political autonomy they claimed as a right. Slaves were a foundational 
element to riograndense expansionist settlement and a key to its export driven 
economy (BENTO, 1976; PALERMO, 2009). In the farrapo case, the calculated use 
of Black soldiers had the intention to provide security from what the riograndenses 
saw as radical aspects of artigusimo in Uruguayan sentiment and laws, but, when 
desperate, the farrapos could leverage loaning their libertos for limited time 
periods and under strict controls to Uruguayans in return for war material, horses, 
and future diplomatic recognition. 
 
Part II:  A Long and Violent Decade                                                                                                                      
In the greater riograndense campanha of the 1840s, the destruction and 
removal of a common internal enemy was a way to contain and inflict damage on 
the twin scourges of haitianismo and artiguismo (YOUSSEF, 2009; FREGA, 
2009). At the time of the farroupilha, Rio Grande so Sul already had a long history 
of slave revolts, insurrections, and resistance, which had their own distinct origins 
and dynamics (MAESTRI, 1993). The situation in Rio Grande do Sul was in no way 
comparable to Haiti’s great military rising: the farrapos exploited liberto military 
expertise, turning against them their own comrades, and their very own aspirations 
for independence in order to ensure white supremacy and a continuation of their 
economic way of life; whereas, in Haiti, white autonomists had lost control over the 
revolution to greater racial and social forces. What occurred in Haiti, the most 
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spectacular act of slave insurrection ever seen, 1789-1803, haunted the Brazilian 
white slaveholders, who knew what had befallen the French white planters and 
three mighty colonial armies in an era far removed in time and distance from the 
farroupilha. When it came to slave insurrection, lapses in time seemed to shrink. 
The libertos, for their part, had acquired the strengths found in their accumulated 
years of fighting to help protect their promised freedom and, hopefully, with 
independence won, to add rights for many others currently in bondage. In them, an 
imposing specter emerged, resonating down to today, of a force, separate and 
distinct, to be equally admired and feared (GARIBALDI, 1859; ARARIPE, 1986). If 
the libertos failed to achieve their freedom, it was not because they lacked will or 
courage, but because they were compromised.  
When Rio and Caxias faced organized afro-Brazilian military power on the 
fault lines of older empires and new revolutions going on in Brazil’s southern 
reaches, they needed to strike fast while the libertos were still believed to be subject 
to the orders of their white officers and Canabarro, in particular. In the 
riograndense corner of the slave world, the Haitian revolution’s legacy was the risk 
to established white society from militarized and politicized slaves. Riograndenses 
witnessed row after row of weaponized, disciplined, Black rebel soldiers, many 
proudly mounted with their lances in hand. For certain, there was real distress 
among loyalist slave owners who had properties confiscated, as well as with many 
in the white ranching establishment in rebellion, who were also fearful of the extent 
and precedent set by their own leaders. Haitianismo incorporated these shared 
elite fears of battle-ready Blacks, who were introduced for several years to the 
rhetoric of republicanism and revolution; and had their own aspirations to be free. 
While no support or participation came from Haiti, the Black republican revolution 
in the Caribbean was not a narrative endpoint. The farrapos clearly set themselves 
apart from what they saw as frightening race disorder taking place in the 
Northeast: the Black Muslim rebellion in Bahia, the cabanagem, and the balaiada 
(Al-ALAM, 2007, p. 39; SOARES and GOMES, 2001; LEITMAN, 2018).  Haiti was 
more than an afterthought (MAESTRI, 1993; GEGGUS, 2006). 
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The day to day uncertainties associated with slave resistance and revolt 
merged with the volatile social components of artiguismo in the borderlands, 
which was very much alive in the Banda Oriental, too, of the 1830s and 1840s, 
where the disciples of the nationalist Uruguayan hero José Gervasio Artigas were at 
war with one another, and heavily invested in the search for slave recruits.  
Artiguismo, the plans, actions, and social thoughts of Artigas, were born in part as 
a counter-weight to the Luso-Brazilian invasions of 1810-1820. A critical element 
was Artigas’ bold strokes when it came to slaves and the rural poor. In order to 
repel the invaders, Artigas actively pursued slaves from all areas of the sparsely 
populated Plate Basin by offering them a more inclusive future (BLANCHARD, 
2008). Later, his brand was taken up by his followers, who would include 
Fructuoso Rivera, in the Cisplatine War, 1825-28. On the very eve of the 
farroupilha, there were provincial operations against well-established quilombos 
close to Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul’s charqueada center with its rich target of 
5,000 mostly able-bodied male slaves, perhaps one of the most concentrated slave 
populations in all of Brazil, just when emissaries of Rivera were said to have 
entered Brazil to provoke slave risings (AL-ALAM, 2007, p.57-58). 
Though Uruguayan abolition came in fits and starts, Artigas was behind its 
beginnings and early growth (BORUCKI, 2009). This trajectory occurred too slowly 
for most; nevertheless, across the border it raised alarm. While artiguista dreams 
of creating confederated states intrigued some influential riograndense chieftains 
who were searching for autonomous solutions to their constrained political and 
economic situations, slave-dependent riograndense ranchers firmly rejected any 
levelling ideas. The best evidence of their adherence to slavery, as they saw it, were 
the requirements of frontier ranching, itself, which used slave labor in herding, 
agriculture, and domestic tasks. It was rumored that Bento Gonçalves da Silva, 
himself, the farroupilha revolutionary leader, president, and commander-in-chief, 
when a guerilla fighter in the late Luso-Brazilian campaigns, had flirtations with 
the artiguistas. He also had ranching and business dealings around Cerro Largo, 
married an Oriental woman, and later, in the years just before 1835, publically 
displayed his friendships with known Oriental revolutionaries (GUAZZELLI, 2015, 
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p.157). Upon his death, his estates were home to over 50 slaves (LEITMAN, 1977).  
He was not alone; ex-farrapo estanceiro nobility were no different (BAKOS, 1985; 
PALMERO, 2009, p. 127). Their emphasis on slavery distinguished riograndenses 
from the Spanish-Americans and justified, as well as would modify, their approach 
to slave recruitment.    
Artiguismo and haitianismo, in the context of the farroupilha, were viewed 
differently by the protagonists, but also overlapped, at times, especially when it 
came to the libertos, whose value as soldiers made them, in addition, important 
negotiating tools alongside horse herds and confiscated cattle. Artiguismo and 
haitianismo were not new dangers but historical temptations woven into the many 
plots and intrigues of the fluid post-Independence La Plata. The joining of the two 
here was Rio’s greatest concern, but Rio, and the rebels, too, also opposed 
artiguismo’s bolder, more democratic positions on slavery and society. Rio dreaded 
the farrapo and Uruguayan use of slave recruits for transnational revolutionary 
enterprises, which had, as a primary objective, the detachment of Rio Grande and 
its possible confederation to Platine riverine states (TJARKS, 1964; VARELA, 
1933). Yet the farrapos, without strong external relationships of the diplomatic and 
financial kind, nonetheless saw advantages to temporary transfers of Black troops 
to certain Uruguayans in order to garner political support and essential war 
supplies, usually horses. While an independent state was their objective, some were 
willing to confederate into broader alliances favored by artiguistas to secure a 
sustainable autonomy. These pacts, plots, and negotiations were open to external 
manipulations and calculations by the many different caudillos and parties, which 
had a cascading effect on the farroupilha’s principal actors, where a move or action 
in one region had consequences in others. Wading into the troubled waters of the 
La Plata was risky, but for those out of power in the early 1840s, principally the 
farrapos and riveristas, starved for material support, there was less to lose, leading 
to the shifting and sometimes stillborn alliances for which the region was known.   
Riograndense rancher militiamen were well acquainted with Artigas, the 
“Jefe de los Orientales y Portector de los Pueblos Libres.” As subjects of Portugal, 
they fought against him, and later again, confronted several of his adherents under 
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the flag of an independent Brazil during the occupation and then defense of the 
Cisplatine. Artigas’ rural homeland was in chaos in the early part of the nineteenth 
century, an open invitation to Luso-Brazilian invasion (STREET, 1959). His radical 
ideas on constructing new nations inspired young Orientals to resist, and interested 
riograndenses to fulfill what they believed to be their own special destiny (SILVA, 
1985, p.280-290). By placing moral and political authority in “soberania 
particular de los pueblos,” Artigas expounded geopolitical theories on how 
determined peoples could constitute themselves first into provinces, then into 
larger entities, loose forms of confederation, and then possibly into a great 
federation (FREGA, 2009). All these map changing possibilities swirling around in 
the Spanish-American self-determination struggles captivated riograndense 
attention as Americans; but, as Luso-Brazilian militiamen and guerilla fighters, 
and, more importantly, as expansionist slaveholding estanceiros, they fought 
against the very same men. Competition over land and cattle separated 
riograndenses from the Orientals everywhere where there was contact, even in the 
poorer grassland zones of the Missões, where Artigas, and later Rivera, had 
remarkable attachments. 
The strange, little known episodic adventures of the artiguista-inspired 
riograndense, called O Quebra, encapsulated pre-farroupilha artiguismo and 
haitianismo. In these years of turmoil and war, 1810-20, riograndenses benefited 
greatly from the acquisition of land and appropriation of herds. Artigas’ armies 
were the enemy, eager to poach riograndense slaves and runaways to help fill 
ranks. O Quebra came from an old estanceiro family and rose to the rank of major 
in the famous dragões, the legendary guardians of the Rio Pardo frontier, before 
being infected by artiguismo. For over the first three decades of the nineteenth 
century, O Quebra unsuccessfully pursued slave recruits, even riding alongside 
Artigas in the Banda Oriental and fighting against absolutist monarchies. On more 
than one occasion, the courts, through family influence, labeled him weak of mind, 
a “louco varrido,” to save him from prison. In 1820, in the little interior town of 
Cachoeira, he with his liberto adjunct at his side raided the local jail, freed the 
prisoners, which included slaves, proclaiming equality for everyone in his new 
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Republica do Rio Grande. Once again, relatives protected him from the laws’ 
clutches despite his repellant artiguista ideas on abolition and equality. During the 
Cisplatine War, the Argentines gave O Quebra command of a regiment, 
Libertadores do Rio Grande, whose very name authorized him to raise the 
province’s slaves. Later, several politically savvy estanceiros adopted his 
americanismo, a continent-wide movement, with artiguista overtones, against 
tyrannical regimes, which was later taken up by farrapos as a call to action. These 
arrangements, fantasies at times, were hard to repress. A full century passed when 
historians, celebrating farroupilha’s centenary, considered O Quebra the precursor 
of riograndense abolition (PUBLICACÕES de AN XXIX, p. 510-512).                                                                                                   
Although artiguismo did not bring Bento Gonçalves to take Pôrto Alegre nor 
the farrapos to formally declare their independence in 1836, it was used to arouse 
estanceiro discontent but not frighten off those who were patriotic. Bento 
Gonçalves had bet upon himself to shape how the movement was going to run. His 
first pronouncements were conciliatory and relatively non-threatening attempts to 
open up a dialogue, a way to renegotiate a stronger place within the Empire 
(SILVA, 1985, p. 22-23). He initiated revolution, yet withheld declarations of 
separation and independence. Bento Gonçalves and the hard-bitten circle around 
him were looking for relief, respect, and recognition shorn of any of the artiguista 
socio-economic goals for those at the bottom. His appeal was always first to 
estanceiro regionalism, which would inflame during the farroupilha and then take 
on mythical dimensions in today’s Rio Grande do Sul. Rio, Bento Gonçalves 
argued, had turned Rio Grande do Sul into a military bulwark and a tax-producing 
entity to support ineffectual and corrupt national interests; and, in return, 
estanceiros, who believed more local authority was coming their way, received less. 
Having once provided the estanceiros with military prestige and land titles in the 
form of sesmarias, Rio indirectly blamed the estanceiros with the loss of the 
Cisplatine. Rio seemed less concerned with borders and the protection of the 
ranchers’ Oriental properties (IBID, p.280-290). 
In shifting blame, Rio went too far, impugning the estanceiros’ patriotism 
and honor. Economically, the ranchers also viewed themselves victimized by the 
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capital of the charqueadores, to whom they were land rich, cash poor creditors. It 
was the coming of a startling new era. No longer content with their monopolization 
of production and commerce, a few charqueadores started buying campanha cattle 
lands, sliding into positions where the old rural families held top rank (BELL, 1998; 
MONSMA, 2012). Though these land ventures were still in their infancy, they 
provoked the estanceiros to adopt certain artiguista concepts in making their fight 
a riograndense one. The promises of the liberal reforms of the 1830s never 
materialized. Instead, the estanceiros saw themselves underappreciated, ignored, 
and in debt. Rio, too, in the midst of nation-building, financial troubles, and the 
reductions in its land forces, offered the rebels the perfect opportunity to seize the 
province. The 1835 rising was not so much a grand political gambit, but a wager to 
tame Rio’s representatives and allies by showing that the Empire needed to make 
accommodations to estanceiro needs and respect their will. The provincial 
government, backed by a small number of regular troops and the recent creation of 
municipal forces, was no match for Bento Gonçalves and his men of the plains 
(MENDES, 2015).                                       
Bento Gonçalves’ clout increased as Rio decreased its standing army in the 
early 1830s and created a new institution, the National Guard, to contain local 
unrest. Unknowingly, Rio provided him with the military means to overrun the 
province and oust Imperial rule. In the post-Cisplatine years, as commander of the 
Jaguarão and now popular head of the recently formed National Guard, Bento 
Gonçalves was cultivating Juan Antonio Lavalleja, the artiguista-inspired hero of 
the Uruguayan War for Independence, 1825-1828, as much as the Uruguayan 
cultivated him. To explain his artiguista ties, Bento Gonçalves was summoned to 
Rio in 1834, which ended, instead, with his walking away with titles, rewards, and 
the knowledge that Rio would not forcefully respond to his future adventurism. 
During the farroupilha, Bento Gonçalves would continue to strike cross border 
alliances with another student of artigista military and political strategy, Fructuoso 
Rivera. There were other security agreements, as well, after 1841 (VARELA, 1933). 
The Uruguayan pacts served these caudillos, who needed a leg up in their own 
contests against those sitting in national and provincial capitals. Later, as the 
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farroupilha was entering its death throes, Bento Gonçalves, who saw his powers 
slipping away to the rising Canabarro, tried to lure Caxias and the Empire into a 
fanciful federation of sorts, a confederation that Artigas would have admired, and 
once again elevate himself in the eyes of his fellow farrapos (VARELA, 1929, II, p. 
346-348; CAXIAS, 1950, p. 140).  
After Bento Gonçalves’ relatively quick takeover of the province, in 
September of 1835, a series of military reverses led to the loss of the lagoon zone, 
including Pôrto Alegre, the capital. These setbacks, reinforced by an overwhelming 
Imperial maritime presence, split the lagoon zone militarily from the interior 
grasslands. The war became static, each side playing to its defensive advantages. 
The ensuing, nearly decade-long war was better known for its lulls than large scale 
actions; but the dizzy pace of events in the spring of 1836 saw cheers turn to cries of 
surrender, and then, almost as quickly, scuttle back to cheers. Just as Antônio de 
Souza Neto’s Seival victory in September of 1836 erupted into an unexpected, 
unplanned-for but highly popular call for independence, the Fanfa disaster, only a 
month later, suddenly brought the entire enterprise into question. Deciding not to 
fold after the Fanfa defeat, which had decapitated a good part of farrapo 
leadership, the rebels went on to establish a republican-styled government at 
Piratini in November (CÂMARA, 1964, 1970).                                               
Rapidly emerging as a war-making state, the new government had the frills 
of mottos and a flag, an army, tax collection stations, even a press, and the 
substance of power with its titled officers and unelected ministers, many of whom 
were born outside the province. Even if some of the ministers had been 
riograndenses by birth and had well-organized support staffs, they still lacked 
cohesive support from the estanceiro-soldiers. The treasury minister José de 
Almeida was the exception. Originally from Minas, Almeida, the only prominent 
charqueador to side with the rebels, had money, powerful Oriental friends, and 
many slaves. But, when taken together, this state collection of entities did not alter 
the disproportionate strength of the estanceiro-soldiers and their families. They 
were the body of men whose orders others followed. The revolution turned out an 
abundance of these ferocious fighters, colonels and majors from the grasslands, 
Revista Brasileira de História & Ciências Sociais – RBHCS 





who recruited their followers in time honored militia ways (BENTO, 1992).  The 
Republic of Piratini, as Rio scornfully called it, cut off from Atlantic trade routes 
and, therefore, deprived of critical war supplies and funds from port revenues, 
adjusted to exploit what was at hand, and count on the political-diplomatic 
implications of artiguismo (LEITMAN, 2018).  Angry over what they saw as a 
double-cross of the truce terms at Fanfa, those farrapos who, earlier on, had 
vision, turned toward vengeance and their appetites. In weighing up the odds, the 
ministers, Almeida too, decided not to take on the colonels, but profit from their 
actions.                               
Increasingly evident was the need for the concentrated firepower from 
infantry and artillery if the rebels were to recapture the lagoon zone from 
entrenched Imperial forces. High on the ministers’ list at Piratini, then, was the 
creation of a professional army to go up against the forces of the Empire, which 
were beginning to trickle in from the northern provinces. The two cariocans, both 
graduates of Rio’s military academy, José Mariano de Matos, the republic’s first 
Minister of War and the Navy, and General João Manoel Lima e Silva, were 
charged with this task. They knew they needed additional troops to catapult the 
new nation into existence. But without the available basics of war-making - the 
arms, shot, heavy guns, uniforms, and, at best, erratic pay - the drawbacks were 
immediately apparent. An officer class, based on discipline and merit to enforce 
organizational uniformity, was unattainable where armies were built upon 
personality, kinship, and patronage. For all the decrees and plans spilling out of 
Piratini, the farrapos remained at heart a loose structure of regional horse armies, 
which could, on occasion, when the campanha seemed threatened, gather 
themselves into larger synchronized, but generally unsustainable actions. Nor was 
there the desire to switch over from short militia stints to longer ones, and 
absolutely no wish to become foot soldiers in a culture that prized horses, nor cart 
around the few cannon that the farrapos managed to secure. Drills and discipline 
were irksome to being pointless. The colonels were intuitive about plains warfare, 
counting on personal courage rather than intricate planning or following a 
hierarchal command structure, with less regard for assaults on entrenched fixed 
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positions. This was best evidenced in the three failed sieges on Pôrto Alegre, a 
terrible waste of time, with men fooling themselves into thinking they could breach 
its fortifications or starve out imperiães. The capital, open to navigable resupply, 
stood fast. Both the minister and general considered slaves reasonable and 
necessary to secure victory, in much the same way as Brazilian Independence 
forces in 1822 had accepted slave recruits (KRAAY, 2006.)  
The plan out of Piratini called for a total of four brigades, three of which 
were heavily weighted toward the cavalry corps of the National Guard. Heading 
each brigade were prominent regional colonels. The designated 3rd brigade stood 
out from the others, the only segregated one. Selection into the ranks was generally 
crude. Matos formed, trained, and organized it with slaves whom Lima e Silva had 
seized in his retreat from Pelotas in 1836, 400 or so, a good start when added to 
those hastily lifted from loyalist estancias in the Banda Oriental, where they took 
part in the first major action at Seival. Lima e Silva and Matos struggled to couple 
gaucho tactical mobility with their newest infantry recruits. Closer control would 
come from non-commissioned libertos or freemen. Matos placed the freemen and 
confiscated slaves into horse drawn artillery, a battalion of infantry, and those with 
horse skills into a corps of “lanceiros negros.” A cautious policy toward slave 
recruitment unfolded; unscheduled yet tempered infusions from farrapo seizures 
would follow, and disputes often arose on the best way to use them, whether in the 
army, the state, or in private work assignments. The war’s many and varied 
dislocations allowed slaves to slip their master’s grip, and since estanceiros could 
not be counted on to voluntarily enlist their own slaves, confiscation was always the 
primary driver to fill liberto positions, and coercion was the method. However, 
overall notions and practices on confiscation in the early years of the war were 
somewhat measured, subject to the prestige and latent power of targeted loyalist 
estanceiros, whom everyone knew would one day return home to their properties. 
The two cariocan professional officers were fire-brand republicans, even 
before the farroupilha, proselytizing inside their regiments; and, not unlike other 
new frontier arrivals, formed local, commercial, and kinship relationships. They 
tended to view the conflict in its entirety and tried, but failed, to better integrate 
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and coordinate the fragmented and regionalized nature of the free-wheeling 
gauchos. Matos and Lima e Silva were the most committed to expanding rebel 
forces with ex-slaves, and thought they would have a better chance to mold the 
libertos into full-time regulars outside the generous furlough system, although, 
from time to time, colonels would draw on them for special assignments, often 
personal and ranch related, such as helping to conduct drives or to break horses. 
Throughout the farroupilha, the libertos were roughly a third of the elastic rebel 
forces, and, as a percentage, mirrored the province’s pre-war slave population of 
approximately a third, remaining so until Porongos. Yet, as important as they were 
in farrapo success, as year-round fighters they were treated unequally in every 
way, and arming them with the best weaponry available was never in the cards. 
Norms and fears associated with slavery, the worry that estanceiros held in 
relinquishing any measure of control to the social excesses of artiguismo, and an 
army weighted toward slaves made the rebels unable to radically alter their militia 
past; and adding the libertos to existing National Guard units was a non-starter, an 
indignity unacceptable to white respectable propertied officers, who wanted to fight 
from horseback, and expected their infantry to absorb the shocks of the 
opposition’s cavalry (BENTO, 1992). Much of the revolution’s longevity rested 
upon the Black brigade, conceived as servants of the state, whose freedom was 
bound to victory, justifying the trust Matos and Lima e Silva had placed on them. 
But the two could not follow their argument to the conclusions they envisioned. 
Lima e Silva died early in the war, and Matos’ efforts to expand liberto forces and 
extend to them additional rights were crushed by the silence of the colonels and 
other delegates at the failed farrapo constitutional convention, 1842-43. After the 
war, one prominent farrapo colonel put it best, estimating a reservoir of perhaps 
five or six times more slaves, upwards of 6,000, had been available to throw into 
the fray. But the rebels totally rejected emancipation or going beyond the 
traditional avenues of individual manumission (PORTINHO, 1990, p. 37). To have 
done so would have required the estanceiro-soldiers to accept broader democratic 
artiguista-like ideas or put into practice the words from O Povo’s masthead: 
“Liberdade. Igualidade. Humanidade.”  
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Only at the very end of the farroupilha did the liberto percentage within the 
army increase, not as a result of policy or need, but from the degradation of the 
traditional gaucho cavalry elements assembled from within their own extended 
families, ranch hands, and dependents.  Over time, death, desertion, disease, and 
amnesty had left Canabarro with an army in decay. Now at its very center stood the 
libertos, perhaps fifty percent of his soldiers that he was gathering on the Cerro at 
Porongos. As rebel will was being lost, the libertos were being gifted with additional 
means and potential to break their own subservience and change the diplomatic 
landscape in the borderlands, whether independently or in league with Uruguayans 
(LEITMAN, 2018).  More relevant still, they saw on their own that fighting gave 
them mobility, though limited, along with the chance to inflict retribution on those 
who had once possessed them. Non-commissioned liberto officers, orderlies, and 
others made decisions and took on leadership roles, giving themselves degrees of 
agency. The temporary nature of their freedom had been made clear by law, 
tradition, and military realities, although there were times when a few were 
awarded alforrias (CARVALHO, 2011). While freedom tied to victory was critical, it 
was not a gift they just accepted, but part of an oppositional process to liberate 
themselves and challenge long held racial stereotypes. One incident near the war’s 
end detailed the larger indictment to come and the predicaments libertos faced. A 
liberto officer, believing his person and orders disrespected by the white son of a 
loyalist prisoner, cut the young boy to pieces. According to one eye witness, this 
brutality horrified his white comrades to summarily end the liberto’s life. Without 
charges or a trial, they signaled the liberto’s conditional status and underscored 
what was to befall the black infantry brigade at Porongos. Porongos was more than 
the war’s final golpe, it was designed to eliminate liberto power, mobility, and 
initiative (LEITMAN, 2018; FETTER, 1892).  
Shocking as Porongos was, it indicated the high level of fear and the need to 
keep the libertos in line as the war was winding down. Instability in liberto ranks 
was a critical concern for Caxias, and Canabarro, too. To Caxias, the libertos were 
an existential threat to the foundations of Brazilian civilization, more than just the 
enemy. He and his family were long held figures of intense national interest, part of 
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Brazil’s ruling elite that owed much of what and who they were to slavery. Though 
Caxias received strict secret instructions from Rio for the terms and conditions for 
pacification, he had almost unfettered say on the methods, and would even bend 
them to fit the situation and needs, not just of the enemy, but of his loyalist 
commanders, as well (WIEDERSPHAN, 1980).  Tristão de Araripe, who 
represented the strong, conservative, monarchical ideas of the age, unkindly 
referred to rebel libertos as the “legião Africana,” and saw them as an intimidating 
menace, compelling Rio to “…procurou por todos os meios dissipar esta força...” 
(ARARIPE, 1986, p. 87).  Unlike the slaves who empowered themselves in the 
Northeastern revolts, these riograndense libertos were regulars, schooled in 
gaucho-style war and in sedition. There were none more deadly, given their 
training and proximity to historic enemies. In the eyes of Brazilian authorities, 
those in the northern revolts were considered disorganized rabble, while the 
farrapo Black brigade had shown, just as in Haiti, that they could effectively 
operate together despite different ethnic origins and places of birth. Even upon the 
conclusion of the farroupilha, Rio contemplated entering the Banda Oriental if 
Black units were still operating there (GUAZZELLI, 2005, p. 20). 
Canabarro, too, was a passionate defender of slavery and, consciously or not, 
inherited the haitianismo and artiguismo that underlay Porongos. With Caxias, he 
shared decisions on security, fashioned through the prism of the possibility of 
libertos’ attaining real freedom backed by their own military capabilities. As a 
rancher, Canabarro lived within the coxilhas of artiguismo. It was not an 
impossible contradiction. Estanceiro-soldiers simply took the parts that they liked. 
Canabarro and the farrapos always had a more mercenary relationship with their 
liberto soldiers than had Artigas, who was more accepting of and encouraging in 
the non-military aspects of their lives. Artigas’ populist federalism was far and 
away ahead of riograndense thinking on incorporating the dispossessed into the 
obligations of citizenship. Riograndenses took careful measure of Artigas’ radical 
social ideas, which incorporated Afro-Americans, the indigenous, and others of the 
“mas infelices” into his armies with the promise of sharing enemy properties. For 
riograndenses, Artigas’ biblical sounding phrases, such as the often quoted, “the 
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most unfortunate shall be the most privileged,” were insurrectional, not devotional 
(STREET, 1959; KATRA, 2017). There were other matters, too, which caused 
ranchers to worry:  Artigas’ ideas on populating interior lands, which would slow 
riograndense expansion; and the implicit argument that giving freedom to armed 
ex-slaves could subvert frontier safety and ranching ways.  
Skillful in its execution, Porongos was devised with subtlety to end not just 
the war, but the combined threat of artigusismo and haitianismo, maintain the 
racial status quo, and erase the rebellion’s original sin of arming and training 
slaves, who were never truly accepted as comrades-in-arms, nor given the ultimate 
reward of citizenship in the new republic. Though the farrapos consistently 
demanded that freedom for slaves under arms was non-negotiable for any 
settlement, it was really testimony to their numbers and importance as fighters 
rather than a credible position to take because it brought fear to the rebels and the 
loyalists, and could lead to a breach for others enslaved. The farrapo leadership, 
given what happened and ensued at Ponche Verde, showed a minimal regard for 
the fate of the libertos. Except for Lima e Silva, Matos, and the Italians, there were 
just a few others who stood up for liberto interests. Bento Gonçalves and his friend, 
the mineiro José Pinheiro Ulhôa Cintra, once defiantly stood by their positions on 
liberto freedom in 1840 when in negotiation, but this, too, faded after 1844-45 
(AHRGS, CV-3101; SILVA, 1985, p. 397).  
 
Part III: Porongos and Its Aftermath  
Porongos was a bone crushing golpe inflicted by Francisco Pedro de Abreu, 
Caxias’ most loyal riograndense colonel, in the early morning hours of November 
14, 1844, where all the dead, wounded, and the vast majority of prisoners came 
from the liberto infantry brigade, an exceptional loss of more than 400 men, a 
significant number by the standards of the day. Just as incredible, Abreu’s force of 
1200 Imperial troops went virtually unscathed. Undeterred, unaffected by the 
military embarrassment, and with Canabarro’s blessing, Antonio Vicente da 
Fontoura immediately continued with his peace mission to Caxias and then on to 
the Court, a conspiratorial plan which they had helped design. Other than Bento 
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Gonçalves’ private letter to a friend concerning the battle and its immediate 
aftermath, in which he asked about the gruesome losses inflicted upon the Black 
infantry, and Almeida’s sensitive documentary search after the war to find, but not 
necessarily publish, the truth surrounding Canabarro’s treason and the “aparatoso 
Convênio de Ponche Verde etc….,” the coxilhas remained silent (SILVA, 1985, p. 
256-257; AHRGS, CV- 673, 2166, 697). Almeida was far from complimentary. He 
said he had proof, important papers. Still, to be fair, Almeida and others of his 
intimates were torn: “…não se pode resvalar de Canabarro a suspeita de traidor 
ou de profundo político” (AHRGS, CV- 673, 7428). Whichever label applied, the 
libertos were massacred under Canabarro’s generalship. In his last years, Manuel 
Alves da Silva Caldeira, who was on the field of battle that day as a lancer, angrily 
cried out for justice in a communication with the great riograndense historian and 
archivist Alfredo Varela. Varela awakened a defiant impulse in the aging Caldeira to 
set the record straight: “Inventem os documentos que quiserem, que não haverá 
ãgua que lave a mancha de sangue posta por Canabarro na bandeira da 
República Piratinense. Fim” (AHRGS, CV-3103).     
The Varela-Caldeira correspondence occurred many decades later during the 
eruption of what became a public controversy amongst prominent riograndense 
historians, and the public, as well, one that persists today: whether or not Porongos 
was conceived in treason, and not the stealthily delivered “surpresa tão gloriosa” 
that Caxias had told the nation. (CAXIAS, 1950 p.148-149). Many of these 
arguments rest on the authenticity of a single document, a copy of the marching 
orders from Caxias to Chico Pedro that spoke to collusion (IBID, p. 147-148).  In 
the ofício, one line specifically offered a glimpse into society’s dehumanizing 
attitudes towards slaves. In the ofício, Caxias instructed Chico Pedro to save only 
whites and Indians in his coming battle. Those loyalist riograndenses riding quietly 
in the night alongside Chico Pedro may have had their own mutinous slaves in their 
sights, if he had unlikely shared Caxias’ secret instructions with them. The clearest 
signs of Caxias and Canabarro’s complicity was the magnitude of the defeat itself 
and the designated targets. The ofício neatly spelled out what would happen, 
principally the targets and escape routes for important farrapo officers. Even if, as 
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some say, the ofício was forged by Chico Pedro to sow dissension amongst the 
rebels, other incriminating evidence points toward a conspiracy. Chico Pedro dealt 
a heavy blow to the mystique of Canabarro as an extremely cautious general. 
Canabarro had shed Bento Gonçalves’ advice on pursuing guerilla operations; 
instead, he mustered all the farrapo forces on to the Cerro. Bento Gonçalves stayed 
away with his small force, staked out in a defensive position far from the field of 
battle, still interested, Caxias said, in “…tirando cavalos e escravos” (CAXIAS, 
1950, p. 135-136).  Uncharacteristically, the well-prepared Canabarro chose to 
ignore advance notices of Chico Pedro’s main force. His most egregious action on 
the eve of Porongos was the disarmament of his Black infantry, over a weak dodge 
over wet powder. All fly in the face of his reputation for combat readiness (SILVA, 
p.256-257).  Other events that preceded and followed the Peace of Ponche Verde, 
too, spoke of secrets which, when viewed together, were specifically designed to 
reduce the liberto threat. The suspicious surprise attack on the lancers, just two 
weeks after Porongos at Arroio Grande by Chico Pedro, and the arrangement 
between Canabarro and Caxias to turn over a sizeable portion of the libertos after 
the peace signing, were all  part of the same Porongos conspiracy.                                                                                                                
Setting aside the aforementioned negligence, a deal reveals itself in other 
ways, most importantly in Caxias’ precautions, plans, and past actions relating to 
Rivera, as the barão prepared to check the libertos’ potential to shift the calculus of 
war and diplomacy against longstanding Brazilian interests. Artiguismo and 
haitianismo were the bitter lessons of borderland distrust, born from a flammable 
mix of riograndense colonels and Uruguayan caudillos. But now, another 
incendiary ingredient, more dangerous than in the past, stood in the way: 
politicized and militarized libertos, organized into a potent, offensive weapon. Both 
generals had an interest in eliminating this impediment to opening the door the 
peace. The rebels would receive amnesty, special payments, future fiscal 
protections, and hopes for more advantageous borders. The Empire would receive 
peace and vital riograndense support in the Plate. But in 1844, Caxias’ 
overwhelming strength and occupation of critical points within the campanha were 
still not sufficient to ward off an uneasiness, a disturbing outlook for him, keen on 
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decisive action. If the farrapos, through guerilla war, interrupted his momentum, 
the war would become harder and take longer. True, he was winning on all fronts, 
but Rivera, in particular, whom he had written off by rejecting his offers to help 
secure a peace, was a meddling distance from the frontier (CAXIAS, 195, p 143).  
Although the farrapos were terribly reduced, Caxias needed to militarily show 
them their cause was lost. By July, Almeida, Matos, Ulhôa Cintra, and Joaquim 
Pedro Soares were all under Caxias’ protection; João Antonio Silveira was far 
across the frontier; and Colonel Antonio Manuel do Amaral was dead. Thus, with 
the Porongos conspiracy, Caxias turned over two stones at once, making evident 
complete military collapse while crippling the liberto threat.                                                                                              
Collusion becomes more obvious and explainable when looking at the 
expanding role the libertos were playing in their full explosive impact that they 
presented to Caxias and Canabarro. By this time, all the war’s principal actors, with 
the important exception of Rivera, knew their roles were no longer permissible. The 
liberto units were too strong to be simply folded back into slavery. Even after 
Porongos and Arroio Grande, some libertos had realized this. Although the 
numbers appear small, disillusioned libertos, long before Porongos, had left rebel 
ranks, wishing to take their chances, even with the Imperial army (FACHAL, 2010, 
p. 107-08). Neither general, nor those whom they represented, wanted former 
libertos operating in the borderlands. The allure of Caxias’ power and those who 
drew near to it, as they sought influence and monetary gain, mattered more than 
any tenuous bonds of comradeship which may have existed between farrapos and 
libertos. The two generals had reached a point to separate Rivera from the Black 
troops. 
Rivera’s interests in the libertos was unlikely to subside. Rio was aware of 
three major pacts, 1838, 1841, and a larger one in 1842 at Paysandú, that involved 
Rivera and other riverine states. In 1842, an unholy complex of challenges, 
including a disturbing European naval component, was bringing the two great 
Platine enemies together, Rosas’ Argentina and Pedro II’s Brazilian Empire. Both 
saw the same impending threat of Rivera and the farrapos woven together as part 
of an old, recurring artiguista dream, a confederation of the riverine states, into 
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what was called the cuadrilátero: Corrrientes, Uruguay, Entre Rios, and at times 
other states confederating to oppose Buenos Aires. Most of these schemes included 
wrenching away the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul. In the first month of 
January 1842, Tomás Guido, the Argentine envoy, had written to the Brazilian 
minister Oliveira Coutinho about a deal for the farrapo loan of “… 500-700 negros 
… para emplearlos en infantería y caballería en la injusta Guerra que [Rivera] 
sostiene contra …” Argentina (FIGUEIRDO and GUAZZELLI, 2012, p. 25). For 
various strategic reasons, Argentina backed out of the proposed treaty with Rio, 
with the realization that Oribe was just as much a problem as was Rivera 
(MESSIAS, 2018 p.99-100).                                               
No other farrapo troops were singled out to take part in these cross border 
activities, just the libertos. As disciplined regular troops, they were more reliable, 
less likely to desert, flee battlefields, fall under the influence of riverisista partners, 
or strike out for personal enrichment. Injecting hundreds of libertos into the Banda 
Oriental was not, at the time, a modest undertaking, but had larger strategic 
purposes: to replace one Oriental party with another and improve opportunities for 
additional state rewards, including diplomatic ties with other nations, loans, and 
new supply avenues, which would flow from recognition. While these pacts were 
tactical, they were also shaky first steps to membership in the family of nations. 
The ill-fated constitutional convention was a more direct effort to gain some partial 
diplomatic recognition, to show the republic as a viable state. Allowing these ex-
slaves to enter Uruguayan territory under white farrapo officers was not fraught 
with much concern since Rivera, the primary recipient, already had opened his 
armies to slaves and freedmen. He needed good experienced troops, as did the 
farrapos, who wanted them back. These possible situations reinforced the libertos’ 
reputation as fearsome fighters and intimidating agents of terror.  
Rivera could not be taken lightly; even counting out a weakened Rivera was never a 
good idea (CÂMARA, 1970, v. 2, p. 407).  He had demonstrated an inexhaustible 
capacity to mobilize new offensive efforts from limited resources, even when on the 
run or exiled to neighboring lands. At Arroyo Grande in Entre Rios, December 
1842, Oribe crushed Rivera, pushing the ousted caudillo further into the 
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hinterlands and closer to the Brazilian frontier, where he was preparing to 
recapture his reputation with few men and means, much as Lavalleja had done in 
the Cisplatine War. Rivera was becoming more active in June and July of 1844, 
rustling large Uruguayan cattle herds into Rio Grande do Sul for ready cash to use 
in his next adventures. His extensive raiding reverberated as far away as Europe, 
causing hide prices to collapse (CADY, 1969, p. 122-123). His activities coincided 
with the courações, unauthorized raids by riograndense rebels to strip hides from 
the ranches of friends and foes alike. The borderlands were aflame. If Rivera could 
sustain his depredations, he could expand his armies and make himself more 
attractive to the farrapos.   
          Just like Bento Gonçalves, Canabarro, too, had little choice but to cut a deal 
with Caxias. But both farrapos, now rivals, had undertaken discussions, 
independent of one another, with the barão. Plagued by corruption, prone to 
accept pardons, and with divisive commanders like Bento Gonçalves and Neto still 
around, Canabarro’s army had become ineffective (CAXIAS, 1950, p. 129, 136). His 
ace-in-the-hole were the libertos, who appeared obedient to his authority, which 
was evaporating. With time passing, Caxias had the resources to keep his 
impressive armies in motion as he squeezed the farrapos into tighter spaces, 
impatient as ever to close out the conflict. In negotiations with Caxias, who had 
rising confidence in Canabarro over other farrapo chiefs, Canabarro viewed 
libertos as internally dangerous, therefore expendable. His army was fast becoming 
a majoritarian Black force, a situation changing the revolution’s principles, as well 
as weakening the underpinnings of riograndense slavery. Farrapos, in general, 
also had few misgivings about libertos as a group being denied their freedom, since 
their origins were in expropriated property. However, their regard for individual 
libertos was different, decided on a case-by-case basis, best seen in the standoff in 
the immediate aftermath of peace when an ownership dispute over a liberto oddly 
arose between Canabarro and Chico Pedro, the very same former antagonists at 
Porongos, neither bashful about trading on their connections to Caxias. Clearly 
both had shared a similar lack of regard to expose the famous Ponche Verde 4th 
article on liberto freedom. While the disposition of the liberto in question is 
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unknown, it showed the same tenacious habits of white ranchers invested in racial 
dominance. These attitudes were turned into strategies just a few years later when 
riograndense cattlemen, on their satellite ranches in Uruguay, insisted that the 
authorities there look upon their slaves, rebranded as colonos, as not subject to 
Uruguayan emancipationist laws.                   
Canabarro nimbly used Rivera’s interests in liberto troops as leverage 
against Caxias.  The Cerro Largo episode, in August of 1844, took place inside 
acknowledged Uruguayan territory, where two corps attacked orbistas to relieve 
pressure on Rivera and extract a large herd of horses (CAXIAS, 1950, p.153; 
VARELA, 1929, 354-355; LEITMAN, 2018, p.143-144). Caxias did not identify them 
as libertos to Rio, but indicated that this no small force was sanctioned by 
Canabarro. (CAXIAS, 1950, p. 141, 143).  Cerro Largo was surgical, but Rio 
understood the power that unbridled libertos in larger numbers possessed if sent 
deeper into the Banda Oriental. Although the attack on Melo, in Cerro Largo, failed 
miserably, it was pivotal, opening up a back door channel between Canabarro and 
Caxias. Both men were already building levels of trust in a series of prisoner 
exchanges (AHRGS, CV-3393, 3397). The one after Cerro Largo proved the most 
important, where the powerful oribista colonel, Dionisio Amaro, served as the go-
between. Messages from Canabarro went into the hands of Chico Pedro, who 
certainly carried them to Caxias (AHRGS, CV-3393). The attack there had shown 
Caxias, whether by design or not, Canabarro’s ability to influence Rivera. However, 
Rivera continued to misrepresent himself to Caxias about his standing with the 
farrapos (VARELA, 1933, v. VI, p.200; VARELA, 1929, vol. II, p. 329). 
A wary Caxias politely brushed away Rivera’s intercession proposals, 
perhaps because he had strong inklings of the existence of a recent pact between 
Canabarro and Rivera, which had led to Cerro Largo (AHRGS, CV-3725, 3726; 
CAXIAS, 1950, p. 142). Caxias bluntly informed the rebel chiefs of his distaste for 
their associations with the Uruguayan. His forceful rejection of Rivera’s 
interference told the rebels what they already knew, that it was time to strike a deal 
with the Empire, to be sweetened by the first installments of what Caxias called 
small favors (CAXIAS, 1950, p. 159). Bento Gonçalves, who was kept outside the 
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private discussions, knew it was “…os ambiciosos de mando e ouro….” that drove 
the final bargain (SILVA, 1985, p. 259-260; SOUZA, 2008).  For Caxias and the 
Empire, liberto freedom could not stand; it was a sacred stipulation in his secret 
instructions from the Court. In no way could they establish a most dreaded 
precedent, rewarding rebellious secessionist slaves with freedom, allowing them to 
exist like a magnet for other captives to follow, entangling Brazil into unwanted 
Platine affairs before Rio Grande do Sul was firmly back into Rio’s orbit (AHRGS, 
CV- 3727).  Rio had begun planning against this inevitability back in 1841, aware of 
grander aspirational artiguista-like plans to ally and coordinate troop movements 
between Rivera and the farrapos. Rio would never acquiesce to any military-
diplomatic reordering in the south which included trained Black brigades. The past 
riverista-farrapo treaties of 1838 and 1841 brought these concerns to the fore, 
never mind their harmful ramifications on the institution of slavery inside Brazil.                                                                                                                
In advising the Court of the victory at Porongos, Caxias proudly announced 
that in the papers left behind by the fleeing rebels, Imperial officers had found 
concrete evidence of a treaty of alliance between the farrapos and Uruguayans 
(CAXIAS, 1950, p. 150). Caxias told Rio, “Esta aprehensão da Correspondincia he 
de summa importancia: sobrepuja em valor á Derrota que soffreu o inimigo….” 
(CAXIAS, 1943, p. 300-306). So secret and treacherous, he trusted only his closest 
confidant to hand deliver it to Brazil’s foreign minister during Fontoura’s peace 
mission to Rio. At the heart of the past riverista-farrapo pacts were the liberto 
transfers. The Cerro Largo August engagement was no different, justifying to 
Caxias the measures and tactics employed at Porongos and revealing the “boas 
intensões” of Rivera (CÂMARA, 1970, v. 2, p. 531). Perhaps Canabarro had baited 
him. Though Caxias does not give specifics, it appears that he was correct about the 
existence of such a convenio, which did take place on the frontier in March of 1844 
between emissaries of the farrapos and Rivera, an alliance more menacing than 
ever imagined. Caxias was, at the time, taking every military and diplomatic 
precaution to separate Rivera’s forces from linking up with Canabarro’s (CAXIAS, 
1950, p. 119-120). With Canabarro’s Porongos documents in hand, Caxias was now 
aware of the ominous role played by the well-known Daniel Gomes de Freitas.  
Revista Brasileira de História & Ciências Sociais – RBHCS 





Freitas was no ordinary revolutionary. He was one of the principal leaders in 
the Bahian slave rebellion, sabinada, 1836-37, an experienced artillery officer, 
fervent republican, person of color, and its minister of war. If any place in Brazil 
resembled the Haitian experience, it was Bahia, supported by sugar cane 
plantations, worked by a slave population vastly larger than its white oppressors. 
He was not the only Bahian from the sabinada who joined the farrapos, each with 
his former rank intact, a bone of contention for some colonels. Bento Gonçalves 
owed his 1837 escape from Fernando de Noronha fortress in Salvador to Bahian 
republicans, to whom he remained indebted. On his return from prison in the 
north, in the face of withering push backs from certain powerful riograndenses, 
Bento Gonçalves and Matos stood up to defend these darker skinned outsiders.                                                                                                                                          
Again, in May 1844, Freitas was part of another secret farrapo mission, 
carrying letters from Canabarro and Manoel Lucas de Oliveira, the last rebel 
minister of war, to revolutionaries of the mineiro-paulista revolt of 1842, of which 
he had also been a part. Nevertheless, his involvement was a measure of personal 
trust and familiarity with conspiratorial diplomacy. Freitas’ latitude in his treaty 
discussions with Rivera’s representative, its content and approval process, and the 
extent libertos were expected to play remain unanswered. Interestingly, during the 
sabinada, despite his own mixed background and revolutionary experiences, 
Freitas was reluctant to establish a batalhão de libertos and admit slaves, in 
particular those African-born, into standing rebel units. Obviously, since the 
libertos led the attack on Cerro Largo, he must have changed his earlier thinking or 
was carrying out strict orders reviving engagement of libertos in Uruguay. Ever the 
revolutionary, Freitas proved as stubborn as Neto when coming to terms with Rio 
in 1845. He and an unknown number of libertos followed Neto into the 
Tacuarembó, later becoming Neto’s bookkeeper for his several ranches (KRAAY, 
2004; AHRGS, CV -5007,7333, 5727 and 5728; VARELA, 1929, v. II, p. 330; 
SPALDING, 1963).   
If Caxias had any doubts about his arrangement with Canabarro and the 
resulting Porongos massacre, they receded when he was informed of the impressive 
body count, the prisoners taken, battle flags gathered, and arms taken off the field 
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along with several hundred horses. In scoring the most devastating victory of the 
war, Caxias confirmed his partnership with Canabarro and Fontoura. He further 
bound them tighter to his plans, introducing only these two farrapos, Fontoura in 
person, to Rio’s secret terms and conditions and the Decree of December 18, 1844.  
According to Almeida, if the other rebel chiefs had known of the humiliating 
content, amnesty, they would not have kneeled at Ponche Verde (AHRGS, CV-
7437.) But, according to Bento Gonçalves, they had already been bought. Almeida, 
in the 1860s, was expressing bitterness over fortunes lost and Fontoura’s 
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The liberto handover at Ponche Verde represented rebel good will to what 
was agreed upon, and provided an important reassuring visual, further reinforced 
by newspaper reporting on their embarkation to and arrival in Rio. With his 
instructions from the Court, Caxias sent them off to a quasi-military life in Rio’s 
naval yards, forts, and hospitals, not much different than the restricted liberty they 
once had as farrapo soldiers. In both sets of circumstances, they were freedmen 
who were not truly free. As ex-rebels now in service in Rio, the libertos took pride 
in their military duties, exchanged bonds of loyalty with their comrades, 
appreciated their own self-worth when confronting their new harsh and unjust 
naval conditions, as well as suffered indignities and constrained movement. Stirred 
by what befell them, the former libertos were unafraid to formally and boldly grieve 
their circumstances. Caxias and the Court were correct in their apprehensions 
about liberto solidarity and courage (CARVALHO, 2011). 
The Empire was steadfast in denying libertos their freedom as a part of any 
peace accord, although most Brazilians then and now believed liberation had come 
to these faithful soldiers. Once, not long after Ponche Verde, questions arose in the 
Brazilian parliament about costs and the numbers receiving alforrias. Francisco 
Álvares Machado, the paulista parliamentarian in charge of the debate, cut it off: 
“Não e bom que sejam chamadas todas estas cousas a exame” (VARELA, 1929, II, 
p. 447). By saying little he had spoken volumes about the deals, intrigues, payouts, 
and false promises wrapped up in the peace. Machado understood better than 
anyone Rio’s hard and fast position. In 1840, he had led important discussions in 
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Rio Grande do Sul, where Rio’s terms and conditions mirrored those eventually 
reached in 1845. The atrocities of Porongos and Arroio Grande, and the farce of the 
Peace of Ponche Verde, together showed the fragility of farrapo commitments 
(FLORES, 2004).  Unable to recognize an alternative society, Rio saw only a 
debilitated state if slaves who rebelled, or, worse, were on the losing side, and 
walked away free, a terrible model and incentive for others.                                                                                                                                           
When signing the Peace of Ponche Verde, riograndenses believed that they 
had struck an accord with the Empire. But by design, neither Caxias nor any other 
Imperial officers were present. Since there were no ceremonial counter signatures, 
Caxias had softened the terms of surrender, allowing the farrapos to hold on to the 
belief of two nations coming to the table, an act that restored rebel honor 
(FLORES, 2004).  After Ponche Verde, there were murmurs in private 
correspondence, but little else to call out Canabarro’s treason. The many times 
more powerful Caxias was, likewise, absolved from criticism, as long as enough 
money had been sprinkled to compromise public complaints. Canabarro and 
Caxias’ collaboration was based on the sharing of the two surprise attacks and 
other explosive monetary secrets. Untouchable, then, Caxias’ career would go on to 
reach still greater heights. Riograndense loyalists and ex-farrapos, too, expressed 
true admiration for him, voting him in as their new provincial president, as they 
awaited restitution from his special paymaster, none other than Fontoura.                                                               
Militarily sold out at Porongos and Arroio Grande, the libertos were too 
weak and fragile for any kind of group response. Porongos had completely 
decimated the “[I]nfortunada infantaria” (SILVA, 1985, p. 256-257). They had no 
white allies, just enemies. The clearest lesson on what the libertos really meant to 
the rebel elite was the shockingly little obligation shown, not only in the moments 
of battle, but afterwards, as the liberto fragments were returned to masters or 
dispatched to Rio’s naval facilities. Caxias and the Empire took fast and rapid 
action to cleanse the battlefield of this domestic enemy. Where impunity reigned 
and Imperial forgiveness became the rule, the libertos were reduced to military 
footnotes (VARELA, 1929, v. II, p. 398). In finalizing the tacit agreement, Brazil 
satisfied farrapos and loyalists alike in reparations to reduce any ill will. Secret 
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payouts were always in the offing, and everyone knew who was on Fontoura’s list, 
but not the amounts received (SILVA, 2010, 2016).          
In addressing long standing riograndense grievances, the Empire began to 
seriously take up Brazil’s southern limits, adjust the imbalanced duty structure 
weighing on riograndense cattle products, and promote provincial ranching 
interests, which included officer status. In return, the Empire, after a stubborn war 
of long duration, finally had peace and the restoration of its prized cavalries. For 
the moment, the borderland areas where riograndenses predominated were 
relatively quiet as conciliation set in under Caxias’ presidency. Chico Pedro raided 
across frontiers and the guerra grande continued on in bursts, but within the 
confines of the province Caxias was determined to stamp out leftover signs of 
internal unrest. Brazil could not afford any repeat performance or variation on 
haitianismo and artiguismo themes, as the challenge of Rosas’ Argentina seemed 
inevitable. The most tragic cost was pacification paid in lives and the removal of the 
libertos as an internal and transnational threat.  
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